

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRETOR 04653 01 OF 04 090929Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----026612 090934Z /12

O R 090825Z SEP 77
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8738
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 PRETORIA 4653

EXDIS

FOR ASST SECY MOOSE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PDEV, RH
SUBJECT: RHODESIA AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE OWEN-YOUNG ROUND
OF TALKS

REF: STATE 212757,

THE NEW SITUATION

1. WE SENSE THAT PUBLICATION OF THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER
AND PROSPECTS OF EARLY AND FAVORABLE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION
OF THE PLAN FOR UN INVOLVEMENT HAVE CREATED A NEW SITUATION.
SUPPORT FROM MOST OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AS WELL AS
PRESIDENT OBASANJO HAS PRESENTED A DILEMMA TO THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT, WHICH SEEMS NOT TO WELCOME THE PROSPECT OF ELECTIONS
IN A SITUATION IT DOES NOT CONTROL. SITHOLE AS WELL AS
MUZOREWA APPEAR TO HAVE FOUND THE PROPOSALS BETTER
THAN ANTICIPATED AND IN VOICING SUPPORT FOR KEY
ELEMENTS MAY HAVE COMPLICATED SMITH'S HOPES FOR EARLY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRETOR 04653 01 OF 04 090929Z

MOVEMENT TOWARD AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. SITHOLE,
HOWEVER, MAY BE PLAYING A DOUBLE GAME AND KEEPING
HIS OPTIONS OPEN. SMITH, FOR THE MOMENT, IS ENJOYING
THE POSTURE OF HAVING ADOPTED A LESS NEGATIVE PUBLIC
POSITION THAN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. HE MAY HOPE THAT
DIVISIONS WITHIN THE BLACK NATIONALIST RANKS WILL
BRING THE INITIATIVE TO NOUGHT. STILL, HE VERY LIKELY

CALCULATES THAT DESPITE THE PF'S PROBLEMS WITH THE PLAN AND HIS OWN ELECTION "MANDATE," THE FUTURE IS MORE UNCERTAIN THAN IT APPEARED A MONTH AGO AND THAT HIS OPTIONS ARE SHRINKING. MEANWHILE, THE SOUTH AFRICANS PUBLICLY DISPLAY SANGFROID. WE UNDERSTAND THEY ARE TELLING SMITH NOT TO SHOOT DOWN THE PROPOSALS. THEY WANT A SETTLEMENT BUT ARE STILL NOT WILLING TO PRESS SMITH INTO ACCEPTANCE. THEREFORE, THEY PLAY FOR TIME PROBABLY SHARING SMITH'S HOPE THAT DIVISIONS AMONG THE BLACK NATIONALISTS WILL CAUSE THE INITIATIVE TO COLLAPSE WITHOUT RHODESIA OR THE SAG HAVING TO BEAR THE ONUS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOUTH AFRICANS RECOGNIZE THAT BLACK NATIONALIST SUPPORT FOR THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS MAY JELL UNDER THE COMBINED PRESSURE OF THE FLPS AND NIGERIA AND THEY WILL BE FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN STICKING WITH SMITH COME WHAT MAY OR BOWING TO INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS.

2. WE ASSUME THAT SMITH AND THE BLACK NATIONALIST LEADERS ARE FACTORING INTO THEIR CALCULATIONS THE BRITISH POSITION THAT UNLESS THERE IS AGREEMENT ON LAW AND ORDER ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, HMG WILL NOT MOVE FORWARD WITH THE PLAN. GIVEN EXISTING DIFFERENCES, THEY PROBABLY ALL FIGURE THAT THERE IS STILL ROOM FOR MANEUVERING, ALTHOUGH THEY MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE INITIAL UN ACTION AUTHORIZING A UN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRETOR 04653 01 OF 04 090929Z

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL ADD IMPORTANT MOMENTUM TO THE INITIATIVE.

PROBLEM AREAS

3. IN THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE PLAN (I.E., BETWEEN NOW AND THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A LAW AND ORDER AGREEMENT), THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS WE FORESEE ARE:

- A) THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FLP SUPPORT COMING UNSTUCK IN THE FACE OF PF OPPOSITION, AND
- B) THE POSSIBILITY OF A DRAMATIC AND PRE-EMPTIVE MOVE BY SMITH TO AN ALTERNATIVE SETTLEMENT.

4. ASSUMING WE ADVANCE AS FAR AS THE CARVER-UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE-MILITARY LEADERS NEGOTIATIONS ON LAW AND ORDER, WE WILL CONFRONT IN THIS PHASE:

- A) HOW FIELD MARSHALL CARVER AND THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ARE GOING TO PERSUADE THE MILITARY LEADERS TO NEGOTIATE IF ONE OR MORE REFUSE TO DO SO;
- B) HOW TO MAKE THE RHODESIAN AND PF MILITARY LEADERS ACCEPT A SCHEME THAT WILL NOT GIVE ONE FACTION PREDOMINANCE OVER ANOTHER; AND

C) HOW TO INSURE THAT SITHOLE AND MUZOREWA DO NOT
SHIFT BACK TO A SMITH ALTERNATIVE SETTLEMENT.

5. WE MAKE THE ASSUMPTION THAT IF A LAW AND ORDER
AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED IN THE SECOND STAGE, THE
BIGGEST CONSENSUAL HURDLE WILL HAVE BEEN OVERCOME AND
THE REMAINING PROBLEMS, WHILE NUMEROUS AND DIFFICULT, WILL
BE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE OF SOLUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRETOR 04653 02 OF 04 090957Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----026901 091002Z /13

O R 090825Z SEP 77
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8739
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 PRETORIA 4653

EXDIS

FOR ASST SECY MOOSE

US LINE OF ACTION

6. GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTIES WHICH SURROUND ALL STAGES
OF THE PLAN, WE BELIEVE OUR STRATEGY AT THIS STAGE
SHOULD BE TO BUILD MOMENTUM WHICH THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS
WILL FIND HARD TO RESIST AND WHICH WILL HAVE THE EFFECT
OF CLOSING OFF OPTIONS THAT COULD DEFEAT THE PLAN.
SPECIFICALLY, OUR PRIMARY LINE OF ACTIONS SHOULD BE TO:
--PUSH AHEAD WITH SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

--FIRM UP FRONT LINE AND OAU SUPPORT, AND THROUGH THESE CHANNELS
ENCOURAGE A MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE FROM THE PF.

--DRAW MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE INTO FIRMER COMMITMENT TO THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN INITIATIVE AND AVOID GIVING THEM CAUSE TO GO
FOR THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT OPTION WITH RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA.

-SIGNAL TO THE SAG THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES
OF SMITH'S REFUSAL TO PROCEED TO THE NEXT STEP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRETOR 04653 02 OF 04 090957Z

EARLY UN ACTION

7. EARLY MOVEMENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD INHIBIT
SLIPPAGE IN THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS'S SUPPORT AND,
PROVIDED THE SOVIETS OR CHINESE DO NOT VETO THE ACTION,
GIVE MAJOR IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. SECURITY
COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT WOULD ALSO TEND TO DISCOURAGE A
UNILATERAL MOVE BY SMITH, OR IF HE SHOULD BEGIN TO
IMPLEMENT AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT TWO
WEEKS, IT SHOULD SLOW ITS DEVELOPMENT. WE BELIEVE MUZOREWA'S
AND SITHOLE'S EXPECTATION OF FAVORABLE UN ACTION IS
PROBABLY A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THEIR PRESENT REJECTION OF
COOPERATION WITH SMITH. SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL
WOULD ALSO UNDERScore TO THE SAG THE POTENTIAL REALITY OF
SANCTIONS SHOULD SMITH NOT COOPERATE. CONSEQUENTLY, IF POSSIBLE,
WE SHOULD MAKE OUR MOVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL EVEN EARLIER
THAN NOW CONTEMPLATED.

DISCOURAGING THE INTERNAL OPTION

8. SMITH'S RELATIVELY CAUTIOUS PUBLIC ATTITUDE, I
BELIEVE, IS IN LARGE PART A RESULT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
BELIEF THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THE BLACK NATIONALISTS
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE ON THE PLAN AND THAT RHODESIA
SHOULD THEREFORE NOT ASSUME THE BURDEN OF TERMINATING THE SEARCH
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. BUT WHILE KEEPING ALIVE HOPES
OF RHODESIAN COOPERATION IN AN EXTERNAL AGREEMENT, SMITH, I
BELIEVE, IS STILL PINNING HIS HOPES ON AN INTERNAL OPTION.

9. DURING THE CAMPAIGN, SMITH TALKED OF THE EARLY
FORMATION OF A NEW "BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT" INCLUDING
BLACKS. NEAR THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN IT APPEARED THAT
SMITH WAS COUNTING ON SITHOLE, TOGETHER WITH MUZOREWA
DEFECTORS TO FORM THE BASIS OF HIS INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRETOR 04653 02 OF 04 090957Z

BUT, IN THE WAKE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, SITHOLE HAS
STIFFENED HIS POSITION AND PUBLICLY REJECTED AN INTERNAL
SETTLEMENT. HE IS NOW EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE PLAN
AND ACCUSING SMITH OF TRYING TO USE THE INTERNAL OPTION
TO AVOID COMING TO TERMS WITH THE BRITISH PROPOSAL.

10. MUZOREWA, WHO, DESPITE HIS RECENT TROUBLES, STILL PROBABLY CONSIDERS HIMSELF THE BIGGEST VOTE-GETTER IN RHODESIA, SUPPORTS THE PLAN APPARENTLY BECAUSE HE BELIEVES IT WILL GUARANTEE A ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE ELECTION FREE OF EITHER WHITE OR PF INTIMIDATION. AT THE SAME TIME IT IS LIKELY THAT SITHOLE, AND PERHAPS EVEN MUZOREWA, ARE USING THE BRITISH PLAN AS A BARGAINING LEVER IN CONTINUING TALKS WITH THE RHODESIAN REGIME. ACCORDING TO A SEPTEMBER 6 PRESS REPORT FROM SALISBURY, A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION HAS ALREADY BEEN DRAWN UP (JOHANNESBURG 2380). AS SITHOLE STILL APPARENTLY HAS LESS POPULAR SUPPORT THAN MUZOREWA, HE PROBABLY RETAINS A SPECIAL INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT ROUTE TO POWER.

11. THE MAJOR PROBLEMS THAT BOTH MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE HAVE WITH THE BRITISH PLAN IS THE UNDERTAKING TO BASE THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY ON THE LIBERATION FORCES. WE CAN ASSUME THAT SMITH IS HEAVILY EXPLOITING THIS ISSUE IN HIS EFFORTS TO MOVE TOWARD AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. DURING THE SALISBURY TALKS, MUZOREWA ALSO EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN WITH THE PROSPECT OF BEING EXCLUDED FROM THE NEXT PROPOSED ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS--I.E., ON SPECIFIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. SITHOLE APPARENTLY SHARES THIS CONCERN. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE THAT HE IS, IN FACT, EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITY OF HOW HE MIGHT CREATE SOME INSTANT MILITARY FORCE OF HIS OWN IN ORDER, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO QUALIFY AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE TRANSITION SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRETOR 04653 03 OF 04 091007Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----027021 091008Z /13

O R 090825Z SEP 77
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8740
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 PRETORIA 4653

EXDIS

FOR ASST SECY MOOSE

12. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE HELPFUL IN DISCOURAGING INTEREST IN THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, IF WE COULD SOMEHOW INDICATE TO MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE THAT THEY WOULD ALSO BE CONSULTED BY FIELD MARSHALL CARVER AND THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON SECURITY QUESTIONS INCLUDING THE FORMATION OF THE ZIMBABWE ARMY. WE WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFUL IN CONVEYING SUCH A MESSAGE TO AVOID GIVING THE PF CAUSE FOR ANOTHER OBJECTION TO THE PLAN.

13. IN ANY EVENT, WE MUST BE PREPARED WITH A CONTINGENCY RESPONSE SHOULD SMITH SPRING AN INTERNAL ACCORD PRIOR TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION. IF THE "SOLUTION" IS A CHARADE INVOLVING BLACK PUPPETS, WE SHOULD HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IGNORING IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SMITH PRESENTS A CONSTITUTION OR A DRAFT PROPOSAL EMBODYING UNQUALIFIED ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE, A SHORT TIMETABLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WITH IMPORTANT BLACK REPRESENTATION, WE WOULD BE IN A MORE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRETOR 04653 03 OF 04 091007Z

DIFFICULT POSITION. WE WOULD FACE PRESSURE FROM THE FRONT LINE STATES TO CONTINUE WITH THE GAME PLAN WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT ENCOUNTER (ESPECIALLY THE BRITISH) SERIOUS POLITICAL RESISTANCE TO THE APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.

ISOLATING THE SAG

14. I CAN ONLY GUESS AT BOTHA'S AND CORSTER'S POSITION AT THIS POINT. ESSENTIALLY IT SEEMS TO BE ONE OF CONTINUED WATCHFUL WAITING, HOPING THAT THE PLAN WILL NEVER MAKE IT TO THE POINT OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION. BUT EVEN IF UNSC AUTHORIZATION FOR A UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IS OBTAINED, I BELIEVE THEIR INCLINATION WILL BE TO ADVISE SMITH TO MAINTAIN AN ATTITUDE OF REASONABLENESS TO SEE WHAT THE CARVER-UN REP--MILITARY LEADERS NEGOTIATION ON LAW AND ORDER WILL PRODUCE, IN THE BELIEF THAT BLACK NATIONALIST AMBITION AND RIVALRIES MAY WELL CAUSE THE INITIATIVE TO FOUNDER AT THIS STAGE. OF COURSE, I WOULD EXPECT THEM TO COUNSEL SMITH TO CONTINUE DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE SETTLEMENT (PERHAPS INCORPORATING ELEMENTS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN SO THAT IT CAN BE PORTRAYED AS A REASONABLE VARIATION) TO USE IN CASE OF A DEADLOCK.

15. WE HAVE NO GUARANTEE THAT THE CARVER-UN REP-MILITARY LEADERS NEGOTIATIONS ON LAW AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION WILL BE

SUCCESSFUL. BUT WHILE WE PRESS FORWARD ON THE PLAN, OUR STRATEGY TOWARD SMITH AND SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE TO CONTINUE TO NARROW THE BASIS OF THEIR HOPES THAT THE MOMENT OF TRUTH MIGHT BE AVOIDED OR THAT THERE ARE VIABLE ALTERNATIVES. IN ADDITION TO ENHANCING THEIR SENSE OF ISOLATION AND ACCELERATING THE COURSE OF EVENTS AS RECOMMENDED ABOVE, WE SHOULD FURTHER HIGHLIGHT THE PRICE THAT SOUTH AFRICA MAY HAVE TO PAY FOR NON-COOPERATION.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRETOR 04653 03 OF 04 091007Z

16. I WOULD RECOMMEND NOT TOO OPEN AND BLUNT AN APPROACH SINCE THIS RAISES HACKLES AND STRENGTHENS RESISTANCE. ONE STEP WOULD BE FOR THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND ME TO BRIEF PIK BOTHA ON HOW THE PLAN IS ADVANCING. IF WE WERE ABLE TO RELAY THAT THE PF IS FALLING INTO LINE AND HAVE NKOMO AND/OR MUGABE MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO SUPPORT THIS, IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIV. ANOTHER STEP IS TO HAVE AN AUTHORITATIVE REPORT FED TO THE SAG ON COURSE OF ACTION WHICH THE CORE GROUP OF MAJOR TRADING COUNTRIES IS CONSIDERING. THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVER, OF COURSE, WOULD BE A SIGNAL FROM IRAN, THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN OIL. IF AN OIL EMBARGO AS PART OF THE SANCTIONS PACKAGE IS A POSSIBILITY, WE SHOULD SUGGEST TO THE IRANIANS THAT THEY SEND A PRIVATE SIGNAL TO SOUTH AFRICA BRINGING INTO QUESTION IRAN'S ABILITY TO SUPPLY OIL IN THE EVENT OF A UN-SANCTIONED EMBARGO.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRETOR 04653 04 OF 04 091010Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----027113 091011Z /13

O R 090825Z SEP 77
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8741
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 PRETORIA 4653

EXDIS

FOR ASST SECY MOOSE

THE FRONT LINE

17. I FULLY CONCUR IN AMBASSADOR SPAIN'S RECOMMENDATIONS
IN REGARD TO HOLDING THE SUPPORT OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS
AND WINNING THE COOPERATION OF THE PF (DAR ES SALAAM 3644).
BOWDLER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 09-Sep-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977PRETOR04653
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770326-1220
Format: TEL
From: PRETORIA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770980/aaaacpxy.tel
Line Count: 399
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: e8429849-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 77 STATE 212757
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1331311
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RHODESIA AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE OWEN-YOUNG ROUND OF TALKS
TAGS: PDEV, RH, US, UK, (OWEN, DAVID), (YOUNG, ANDREW J)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e8429849-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009